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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860172-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for one count of 
Theft, a felony of the Second Degree, and one count of Possession of 
a Stolen Vehicle, a felony of the Third Degree, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, : Case No. 860172-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The statement of the case and statement of facts are set 
forth in Appellant's Brief at pages 1-6. The Appellant takes this 
opportunity to reply to Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER A JUROR AND A PROSECUTION 
WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A RECESS 
In his opening brief, Mr. Larocco argued that he was denied 
his State and Federal Constitutional rights to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury because a member of his jury, Ms. Agnes Lembke, 
discussed his case with state's witness Neil Hailes during a recess 
at trial. (Appellant's Brief at 8-11). Mr. Larocco's right to an 
impartial jury of his peers may also have been undermined because a 
second, unnamed juror may have overheard the Lembke-Hailes 
conversation. Appellant assigns as reversible error the trial 
court's failure to grant the motion for a mistrial raised 
immediately after the improper juror-witness contact had occurred. 
Mr. Larocco contends that the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in State 
v* Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) unequivocally ratifies his 
assignment of error. Appellant's case fits squarely within Pike's 
description of a constitutionally defective jury trial: the contact 
between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was "more than incidental," and 
Ms. Lembke's claim that she was not influenced by the contact in no 
way rebutted the presumption of prejudice which was raised by the 
contact. State v. Pike, 712 Pc2d at 280-81. Furthermore, the trial 
court's error in failing to question the other juror who may have 
overheard the conversation directly parallels the error committed by 
the trial court in Pike.l Appellant's conviction must, therefore, 
be reversed. 
In its response to Mr. Larocco's argument, the State 
erroneously contends: (1) that the contact between Ms. Lembke and 
Mr. Hailes was brief and inadvertent (see State's Brief at 6 and 
11), (2) that Mr. Hailes' conversation with Ms. Lembke, including 
his remarks concerning the general veracity of police officers, 
could not have prejudiced the proceedings because Mr. Hailes' 
testimony was "inconsequential" in the case and because none of the 
testimony given by police officers was ever contested by the defense 
(see State's Brief at 7-9), (3) that even if a presumption of 
^The trial judge in the Pike case cut off the in-camera questioning 
of the witness who had conversed with a juror before the court had 
any real indication of what may have been discussed by the witness 
and juror. Pike, at 279. 
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prejudice did arise in this case, the presumption was rebutted by 
Ms. Lembke's claim that she was not influenced by the contact with 
Mr* Hailes (see Statefs Brief at 10), (4) that the present case is 
distinguishable from Pike because the entire juror-witness 
conversation was uncovered and scrutinized in this case, but was not 
in Pike (see State's Brief at 9-10), and (5) that the court had no 
obligation to voir dire the unnamed juror because "it is clear from 
the record [that she] was not present when the encounter between Ms. 
Lembke and Mr. Hailes took place11 (See State's Brief at 12). In 
light of the rationale underpinning the Pike opinion, the State's 
contentions are meritless. 
The conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was not 
a "brief and inadvertent" exchange as that phrase is implicitly 
defined in Pike* On the facts of the Pike case—involving a 
prosecution witness who told three jurors about "an accident he had 
sustained while cleaning his patio which caused him to limp," Pike 
at 280—this Court concluded "the conversation [in question] 
amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had 
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the jurors' judgment as to credibility." Pike at 281. As in 
Pike, the conversation in the present case involved the friendly 
sort of chit-chat which can readily breed a "sense of familiarity" 
not only between a juror and a witness, but also between a juror and 
one of the parties in the case (see Appellant's Brief at 11-12).2 
^While the Pike opinion does not explicitly point to the danger of a 
juror aligning herself with one party or the other in the wake of 
improper contact with a witness, Mr. Larocco urges the Court to 
consider such a possibility in this case. 
- 3 -
Furthermore, as Appellant pointed out in his opening brief, the 
conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes extended beyond a 
merely friendly exchange when Mr. Hailes propounded upon the general 
credibility of police officers. Such a comment at least raises the 
possibility that the juror-witness contact was not "inadvertent." 
The trial court erred both in failing to prevent this contact and in 
refusing to declare a mistrial once such potentially damaging 
contact had occurred. Regardless of what Mr. Hailes had in mind 
when he initiated the conversation with Ms. Lembke, the 
juror-witness exchange in this case clearly exceeded the level of 
impropriety reached by the conversation in Pike. Mr. Larocco 
respectfully urges this Court to agree that the Lembke-Hailes 
conversation, like the conversation in Pike, "was sufficient to 
warrant a presumption of prejudice." Pike, at 281. 
The State concedes that "[t]he type of contact that 
occurred between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes should be avoided." (See 
State's Brief at 11.) Despite this concession, however, the State 
seems to argue that the Pike case should be narrowly limited to its 
facts (see State's brief at 7-9 and state's enumerated contention 
#(2) above). Surely the rationale of the Pike-Anderson doctrine^ 
extends to afford protection to individuals in Mr. Larocco's 
situation. Surely the rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises as 
readily in the instant case as it does in the case where the state's 
central witness converses with a juror (State v. Pike), or in the 
^Appellant's reference to the "Pike-Anderson doctrine" derives from 
the Utah Supreme Court's central reliance on State v. Anderson, 237 
P 941 (1925) (holding that improper juror-witness contact raises a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice) in the Pike opinion. Pike, at 
280. 
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case where the witness rides to and from the courthouse with a juror 
(State v. Anderson). In all three situations it cannot "be said 
that appellant had the full benefit of trial by an impartial jury 
and was in no way influenced except by the evidence and the 
instructions of the court." Pike at 280 (quoting State v. Anderson, 
supra, at 943). 
While it is true that the conversation between Mr. Hailes 
and Ms. Lembke may not have impacted Ms. Lembke's assessment of any 
of the prosecution's witnesses' credibility (see State's Brief at 
7-9), at least two problems outside of the realm of influencing 
witness credibility may have arisen due to the improper contact. 
First, Ms. Lembke, and the unnamed witness, may have had a tendency 
to align themselves with the state's case due to familiarity with 
Mr. Hailes. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the appearance 
of impropriety and the nagging doubt as to whether Mr. Larocco 
received a fair trial produce a serious, "deleterious effect upon 
the Judicial process." Pike, at 280. The danger the Utah Supreme 
Court sought to guard against with its "stringent [rebuttal 
presumption] rule" is that subtle, insidious form of prejudice which 
"may well exist even though it is not provable and even though a 
person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize 
that fact." Pike, at 280. For these reasons, the presumption of 
prejudice arose as strongly in the present case as in Pike. 
Once the presumption of prejudice arises in any given case, 
a juror may not rebut the presumption for the state simply by 
insisting that the improper contact did not influence him. Pike, at 
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281. It is not clear from the Pike opinion what the State would 
have to show in order to successfully rebut the presumption; 
however, it is clear that the Utah Supreme Court's "stringent rule" 
places a very difficult burden on the Statefs shoulders. Appellant 
contends that this difficult burden has been wisely placed* the 
prosecution and the court should take whatever preventive measures 
are necessary to keep the jury and the state's witnesses separated 
in a criminal case, first, because it is nearly impossible to prove 
"how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by conversing" 
with a State's witness, and second, because of the taint of 
unfairness which permeates the proceedings as a result of improper 
contact. Ms. Lembke's assertion that her contact with Mr. Hailes 
had no influence on her did not rebut the presumption of prejudice 
which arose in this case.4 Furthermore, the court's and 
prosecution's failure to seek out and question the unnamed, blonde 
female juror who may have overheard the conversation (and nothing in 
Ms. Lembke's statements to the court conclusively proved the unnamed 
juror was out of earshot of the conversation) constituted nothing 
less than flirtation with reversible, constitutional error; an 
assignment of such error may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(d) and State v. Poe/ 441 
P.2d 512 (Utah 1968). 
4The state's contention that the present case should be decided 
differently from Pike because Judge Dee (in the present case) fully 
investigated the improper conversation, whereas Judge Banks (in the 
Pike case) did not, is plainly wrong. Indeed, in State v. Anderson, 
supra, the trial court more than fully investigated the improper 
contact and was assured by the witness and juror involved that the 
contact could not and did not influence the verdict. Despite these 
assurances, this Court reversed Mr. Anderson's convictions. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, 
Appellant urges this court to reverse his convictions and order 
dismissal the charges against him, or, alternatively, remand his 
case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this _9 day of March, 1987. 
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